The Objectivity and Rationality of Morality According to Kant morality is rational and objective. It is based on rational human reasoning. For Kant it is not the consequences of an action that make it moral but the reasoning or intention that goes behind the choices one makes. What Kant is saying is that the only thing which can be qualified as good is good intention. When the intention behind an action is good, (what Moral Objectivism by Michael Huemer 1. What is the issue. The present essay is a defense of a view called moral objectivism and attack on its opposite, subjectivism or moral relativism. Moral relativism is probably the subject concerning which more nonsense has been written and said in modern times than any other in moral philosophy Jan 07, · this is to argue for the existence of an objective morality based entirely on rational and scientific reasoning. By "objective morality" I do not simply StudyMode - Premium and Free Essays, Term Papers & Book Notes
Moral Objectivism
The present essay is a defense of a view called moral objectivism and attack on its opposite, subjectivism or moral relativism. Moral relativism is probably the subject concerning which more nonsense has been written and said in modern times than any other in moral philosophy. I suspect this is partly because people wish to provide arguments in favor of relativism without first having a clear idea of what their thesis is; partly because the authors' arguments are mostly rationalizations; and partly because the authors have a poor grasp of moral concepts.
There is little I can do about the second and third problems, but I will try to help the first here. In this section I define "objectivism" and important related terms and delineate several views that might be called subjectivism, which I contend are all demonstrably false. I am not chiefly concerned herein to defend any particular moral claims, although I shall mention some uncontroversial moral truths for illustrative purposes.
Rather, my concern is to show that questions of value have objective, rational answers but not to provide those answers. The latter is a task for another time. Subjectivism holds that morality is subjective. Relativism holds that morality is relative, the objectivity and rationality of morality essay. In the sequel, I am interested in distinguishing moral objectivism from its denial; therefore, I assume that "relative" and "subjective" both mean "non-objective".
If they do not already mean this, then I stipulate that meaning hereby. There are a number of people who believe moral relativism so defined. What is 'morality' I want to make two points about what morality is as I understand it. By this I don't mean to imply that using the word one way commits one to objectivism and using it the other way implies subjectivism or anything like that; there simply are two different legitimate definitions of "morality".
On the 'objective' interpretation, "morality" refers to such situations as something's being right, evil, just, or the like. On the 'subjective' interpretation, "morality" the objectivity and rationality of morality essay to theories about or the study of rightness, evil, justice, and the like.
For example, "People must not use violence against one another" is a claim about morality in the objective sense - that is, it is a value judgement. It seeks to say what is right, wrong, or the like. On the other hand, "In Xanadu, the use of violence is strongly condemned" is not a value judgement; it can be verified or refuted purely by anthropological observation.
It is a statement about morality in the subjective sense. It seeks to say what people consider right, wrong, or the like. I am not going to discuss which of these two interpretations is 'better'. I simply point out the distinction.
An analogous distinction applies to many other words, such as "chemistry", "psychology", "zoology", "mathematics", etc. If there were no people, would there still be chemistry? Well, chemistry in the objective sense would exist, but chemistry in the subjective sense would not: i. Second, in this paper it will be convenient for me to use "morality" in a very broad sense. I the objectivity and rationality of morality essay call "morality" in the objective sense all facts, if there are any such facts, about what is wrong, good, bad, evil, ill-advised, just, beautiful, or preferable, or any other evaluative property.
Anything that is a value judgement will count as part of a morality in the subjective sense. For instance, the fact that Aristotle is a great thinker is a moral fact in the broad sense, because it requires a value judgement to appreciate; so is the fact that it's best to eat when one is hungry, because stating it gives a prescription for action; so is the fact that the world would be better off without tyrants, because it requires a value judgement to observe calling something "better" as well as calling someone "a tyrant" are value judgements.
In particular, I stress that I do not wish to presuppose any particular theory about how people should behave nor any particular reasons why they should so behave. Most people appear to restrict the application of the term "morality" to prohibitions on actions satisfying desires. I disregard this convention. If desires must be held in check, the objectivity and rationality of morality essay, then that will be a moral fact; and equally, if desires need not be checked but provide appropriate and rational reasons for acting I don't mean merely that they make one want to act, which is a purely descriptive fact and not an evaluation, but that acting in accord with them is a good thing then that will be a moral fact.
In other words, my defense of objectivism, while it says that there is at least sometimes a way one should behave, does not actually recommend anything in particular.
It may be asked, what shall we say if it turns out that some values are objective and some are not? The answer I give, by stipulation, is that in that case objectivism is true and subjectivism is false; that is, I interpret "morality is objective" as "some values are objective".
I might have made the opposite stipulation - viz. For instance, I don't think the value 'the right to punish slaves for disobedience' is objective because I don't think there is any such right.
Similarly, any number of values could be enumerated that any given person would declare to be utterly non-existent and thus not objective. Three ways of being non-'objective' Suppose I offer the opinion, "Colors are objective. What I am saying, the objectivity and rationality of morality essay, I think, is that colors are 'in the object.
In colored objects. What does "in" mean here? It means that a color - redness, say - is a property of the objects that are said to be red, that is, that the nature of those objects themselves and not anything else determines whether they are red or not.
Hence, to say that morality is objective is to say that whether an action is right depends on the nature of that action; whether a person is good depends on the nature of that person; etc, the objectivity and rationality of morality essay. Well, that just sounds trivial. How could anything not be objective? So far as I can see, there are three and only three ways for some thing, x, to fail to be objective, for instance for values or colors to not be objective: 1.
If everything is non-x; e, the objectivity and rationality of morality essay. Goodness is not in the object if there isn't anything good. Redness is not in the object if everything colored is some color other than red.
For example, if someone asked whether witchhood is objective, I might answer no, because nothing is a witch. If some things are x, but whether a thing is x depends not just on that thing's intrinsic nature but on facts about the subject, i. Redness is not objective if whether a thing is red 'for some observer' if that makes sense depends on the nature of the observer and not just on the nature of the object. Notice that if and only if a quality is relative does it make sense to append "for some observer" in sentences ascribing that quality; and in that case such sentences do not make sense without the addition.
For example, word meanings are not objective; they are relative. It does not matter what properties the sequence of phonemes has, beyond pronouncibility. If it is neither true nor false that something is x. Someone who thinks values are subjective in this sense would say that value judgements can be neither true nor false. Well, that sounds almost incoherent: how is it possible for a statement to be neither true nor false?
Doesn't that violate basic logic? So far as I can see there are just two ways this is possible. First, if saying something is x is not a genuine assertion, then it is neither true nor false.
I can't think of any examples of an x for which this is true, but there are numerous utterances that do not assert anything, such as, "Congratulations on your Nobel Prize" or "What time is it? It just expresses a certain sentiment.
Second, if an assertion involves a false presupposition, then it may be said to be neither true nor false. For instance, "The king of France is bald" is neither true nor false because it contains a false presupposition that there is a king of France. Some people at any rate have argued that. Another way of stating the thesis that morality is objective is to say that values are 'part of the fabric of reality;' that is, there is some actual state of the world that corresponds to a value judgement.
Again, that sounds trivial; how could any statement fail to correspond to some state of the world? There are the same three ways in which this could happen: if the statement is false; if it is true, but it corresponds to some state of the subject who observes it and not to the external world; or if it is neither true nor false. Several relativist theories Here are a few different things the objectivity and rationality of morality essay could believe in order to be a moral relativist: 1.
Moral judgements are simply universally in error; i. These are concepts without any application. Moral 'judgements' are not genuine assertions. They don't the objectivity and rationality of morality essay claim anything about the world. Instead, they are mere expressions of emotion, as "Hurray" is an expression of emotion. What people do when they make a moral judgement is to project their subjective mental state out into the world. They confuse their emotions with some object in the world and mistakenly take the feeling in them to be some property of the object.
This is the most psychologically sophisticated version of relativism, the objectivity and rationality of morality essay.
An analogous theory might be held about colors: that when people see one of the objects we call "red," we have a certain characteristic sensation, which sensation we confuse with some property of the object that causes it and call the property of being red. Morals in the objective sense are established by convention; i. Things become good or bad in virtue of conventions. What the issue is not Some people argue about whether morality the objectivity and rationality of morality essay anything else can be 'absolute.
I don't know what it means in the context "There is an absolute morality;" therefore, I will not use the term. I am not interested here in whether morality is 'absolute' in any of the other senses than "objective". I am not concerned with whether there are some exceptionless rules for judging moral issues - whether there is an algorithm for computing morality.
My own opinion happens to be that there is not, but that has nothing to do with the present issue. I am also not arguing that there is a universal morality in the sense of a moral code that everybody either the objectivity and rationality of morality essay or would accept.
I am not arguing that we can know moral truths with absolute precision or certainty. I am not considering the issue of whether one should be tolerant of people with differing practices or differing views. That one should be tolerant or that one should be intolerant are particular moral conclusions that are each equally consistent with objectivism. I am not interested in the question of whether at any given juncture there may perhaps be several distinct, equally right actions available rather than only one.
None of those things is the issue. The issue is only, as I have said, whether moral properties are in the object. Perhaps I shall take up the other issues in other essays, but not now. By clarifying the theses of objectivism and subjectivism, I may have just drastically reduced the number of opponents I have, for many readers may have simply dropped out of the relativist camp by reason of hearing what exactly relativism is.
Morality 3: Objectivity and oughtness
, time: 17:13Objective Morality Essay - Words
Moral philosophers have been largely concerned with the question of whether moral judgements are objective or subjective. In most senses, moral judgements are neither objective nor subjective, and the belief that they have to be one or the other is the result of a fundamental error (e.g. descriptivism), which both objectivists and subjectivists blogger.comted Reading Time: 1 min Moral Objectivism by Michael Huemer 1. What is the issue. The present essay is a defense of a view called moral objectivism and attack on its opposite, subjectivism or moral relativism. Moral relativism is probably the subject concerning which more nonsense has been written and said in modern times than any other in moral philosophy The Objectivity and Rationality of Morality According to Kant morality is rational and objective. It is based on rational human reasoning. For Kant it is not the consequences of an action that make it moral but the reasoning or intention that goes behind the choices one makes. What Kant is saying is that the only thing which can be qualified as good is good intention
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